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* Juliet Chevalier-Watts 
 
This has been a much awaited decision and marks the end of a long journey with regard to 
matters relating to political activities and charitable trusts, as well as considering illegal 
activities and charitable purpose. 
 
For a charity to be recognised as charitable at law in New Zealand, and thus take advantage 
of the fiscal and social benefits of this recognition, an entity must apply to the Department of 
Internal Affairs – Charities1 to register as charity.  An entity must demonstrate that it falls 
under one of the four heads of charity, which find their history in the seminal case of The 
Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel2 and now s 5(1) of the 
Charities Act 2005, which states: 
 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, charitable purpose includes every 
charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or 
religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community. 
 
Therefore each purpose must be charitable, although, a non-charitable purpose will not 
automatically negate the overall charitable purpose of an entity so long as that purpose is 
ancillary to the charitable purpose of the entity; it should not be an independent purpose.3 
Section 5(3) of the Act gives an example of advocacy as being a non-charitable purpose.  
Advocacy of a particular view may be construed as “political”, and up until this decision, it 
had long been held in New Zealand that that if an organisation has main or dominant 
purposes that are political in nature, then it will be denied charitable status, although it has 
been asserted that the political purpose doctrine has existed for longer than that.4 
 
The rationale advanced to support the political purpose doctrine is that courts are unable to 
judge the public benefit of a purpose;5 all purposes must have public benefit.6 
 
The basis of the appeal to the Supreme Court was to consider the extent to which purposes 
that are political can be charitable, and that purposes or activities that are illegal or unlawful 
preclude charitable status.  
 
In a split decision, the majority held that the development of a stand-alone doctrine of the 
exclusion of political purposes, which they acknowledged has been a relatively recent 
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development and based on little authority,7 was neither necessary or beneficial.8  In other 
words, s 5(3) of the Charities Act does not enact a political purpose exclusion.  It provides 
that non-charitable purposes do not affect charitable purpose, so long as they are no more 
than ancillary, and the inclusion of “advocacy” in the legislation is merely an example of an 
ancillary non charitable purpose.  However, if an object is the promotion of a cause that 
cannot be charitable because the attainment of the end promoted, or the means of the 
promotion itself does not have the requisite public benefit, then the entity will not qualify for 
registration as charitable.9  On the matter of illegal activity, the Court unanimously held that 
an entity that had purposes properly characterised as illegal would not be charitable.  
However, illegal activities that are not deliberately undertaken or co-ordinated by the entity 
are unlikely to amount to a purpose and therefore may well not amount to a disqualifying 
purpose.10  For the purposes of this case comment, the issue of political purposes will be the 
focus. 
 
The majority of the Court asserted that it was difficult to reconcile supporting a blanket 
exclusion of political purposes when it was difficult to construct any adequate theories or 
principles to support such an approach.11  Indeed, should such a restriction apply, then this 
would risk hindering the responsiveness of the law to changing circumstances of society.12  
Therefore the better approach, as suggested by the majority, is not a doctrine of exclusion of 
political purposes, but rather an acceptance that objects that may entail advocacy for the 
change in the law are simply a facet of whether purposes advance the public benefit in a way 
that is recognised to fall within the spirit and intendment of the Statute of Elizabeth 1601.13 
 
It was noted however that perhaps most often advancement of causes will not be charitable as 
it is not possible to say whether or not views promoted would be of benefit in the way in 
which the law recognises as charitable, which echoed the dissenting views of Kiefel J in 
Aid/Watch Inc v Commissioner of Taxation,14 a recent Australian High Court decision 
concerning political purposes and charitibility, where her Honour stated that “reaching a 
conclusion of public benefit may be difficult where the activities of an organisation largely 
involve the assertion of its views.”15  Therefore in the majority of the Supreme Court’s view, 
whilst it may be accepted that there are circumstances in which advocacy of certain views 
may not be charitable, this does not justify a rule that all non-ancillary advocacy is properly 
characterised as non-charitable.16 
The majority criticised the approach of the Court of Appeal, where that Court suggested that 
views that were generally acceptable may be construed as charitable, whilst highly 
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controversial views would not.   The majority concluded that such an approach would likely 
exclude much promotion of change and instead favour charitable status based on the 
majoritarian assessment and the status quo.  An unpopular cause should not affect its 
charitable status, and therefore lack of controversy equally should not be determinative in 
assessing charitability.17 
The majority concluded the Court of Appeal treating the lack of controversy in New Zealand 
about the goals of nuclear disarmament  and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction 
as determinative of the question as to whether the promotion of these ends was charitable was 
not correct.  The focus should have been on the manner of the promotion.  Since the 
educational objects of Greenpeace are conducted through a distinct charitable trust, any 
educational matters relating to nuclear disarmament and eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction seems unlikely to be key to the promotional effort.  The focus on direct action and 
advocacy on the entity’s website might indicate the main means of promotion, but, a 
standalone object must be of public benefit.  Indeed, whilst advocacy or similar conduct may 
be meet such public benefit requirements, such a finding will depend on the wider context.  
This wider context requires closer consideration than that which was brought to bear in the 
present case however.18   
As a result, the majority concluded that the matter of the charitable nature of Greenpeace’s 
purposes had not been considered on the correct basis.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged 
that Greenpeace had made changes to its objects, which makes it necessary for Greenpeace to 
provide further evidence about its activities.  This was the basis for returning the case to the 
Board of the Department of Internal Affairs – Charities.  It is proper for the Board to assess 
charitable purpose in the first instance.  Therefore, in the majority’s view, the correct course 
of action is to remit the application for reconsideration in light of the changes made to 
Greenpeace’s objects and the reasonings given by the Supreme Court.19 
The dissenting Judges, however, did not concur with the determination of charitable purpose.   
They could not reconcile the notion that political activity could be charitable within the 
meaning of s 5(3) of the Act.  Instead, their Honours determined that it was the intention of 
the legislature to codify this aspect of charity law because this section presupposes that 
advocacy is not charitable unless it is ancillary to that charitable purpose.  Therefore, they 
could see no reason to depart from the ordinary language of s 5(3) of the Act.20 
 
In conclusion therefore, the majority of the Supreme Court confirmed that a political purpose 
exclusion should no longer be applied in New Zealand because political and charitable 
purposes are not mutually exclusive in all circumstances.  Section 5 of the Charities Act 2005 
does not enact a political purpose exclusion with an exception if political activities are no 
more than ancillary. Rather it provides an exemption for non-charitable activities if they are 
ancillary.  However, there is a continued requirement for dominant purposes to meet the 
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public benefit test to ensure that they are charitable purposes.21  In addition, illegal activities 
are not charitable purposes and therefore would disqualify an entity from obtaining registered 
charitable status.  However, breaches of law that are not deliberately undertaken or co-
ordinated by the entity are unlikely to amount to a purpose.  Thus assessment of illegal 
purpose is a matter of fact and degree.22 
This is a welcome case because it provides some clarity in New Zealand relating to political 
purposes and charitable purposes, which has been much needed.  This then brings New 
Zealand charity law more in line with Australian charity law where the political purpose 
doctrine is no longer acknowledged.23  Whilst there may be concerns that the Greenpeace 
decision will open the floodgates to registering as charitable entities that would not 
previously have been eligible for registration as charities, because of their political activities, 
it seems unlikely that this would happen.  The decision still places heavy emphasis on the 
public benefit requirement, and as the majority of the Court pointed out, not all stand alone or 
dominant political purposes will be charitable, because the public benefit will not be 
ascertainable.  Therefore, overall, this is a timely decision, that now provides more certainty 
in this particular aspect of charity law. 
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